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Abstract Evolutionary accounts of the origin of human morality may be speculative to some
extent, but they contain some very plausible claims, such as the claim that ethics evolved as a
response to the demands of group living. Regarding the phenomenon of moral progress, it has
been argued both that it is ruled out by an evolutionary approach, and that it can be explained
by it. It has even been claimed that an evolutionary account has the potential to advance
progress in the moral domain. This paper explores the complex relationship between evolu-
tionary explanations of morality and the possibility of moral progress. It seeks to answer the
question as to what these explanations are able to tell us about the possibility of moral progress
and the ways in which such progress can be achieved. It is argued that evolutionary explana-
tions can inform moral education and other forms of moral enhancement, and that increased
evolutionary knowledge figures among the changes in the circumstances of morality that can
lead to moral progress. Evolutionary explanations can show us certain limits to the possibility
for humans of progressing morally as well as certain enabling conditions. It is argued that both
aspects – enhancement and changes in the circumstances – are equally important for the
achievement of moral progress. This is illustrated by means of two examples of areas in which
moral progress seems possible: our relationship towards the distant poor and our relationship
towards non-human animals.
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1 Introduction
Some recent philosophical accounts of moral progress ascribe an important role to evolution-
ary explanations of the origin and development of human morality (e.g. Jamieson 2002a and
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2002b; Kitcher 2011; Singer 1981). The explanations invoked are to some extent speculative,
but they involve some very plausible claims, such as the claim that ethics evolved as a
response to the demands of group living. The plausibility of such claims gives us a reason
not to dismiss evolutionary explanations of moral capacities and intuitions out of hand because
of the speculative character that attaches to many of them. As “how possibly” explanations
(Kitcher, 12), they deserve consideration.1
Assuming that there is such a thing as moral progress, how does it relate to human
evolution? Two famous contemporaries of Charles Darwin have answered this question in
radically opposed ways. Thomas Henry Huxley wrote: “Let us understand, once for all, that
the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in
running away from it, but in combating it” (Huxley 1989, 141). Herbert Spencer, by contrast,
went so far as to identify the process and the product of evolution with the good. For him,
“good” simply meant “further evolved” (Spencer 1883, 25). On this view, in order to achieve
moral progress, we must let natural selection do its work.
As probably many people will agree, the views put forward by Huxley and Spencer are too
simple. They fail to do justice to the complexity of the relationship between evolution and the
phenomenon of moral progress. Starting from an acknowledgement of this complexity, I seek
to answer the question as to what evolutionary explanations of morality are able to tell us about
the possibility of moral progress and the ways in which such progress can be achieved. Being
interested in a diverse set of morally relevant capacities that humans have evolved, as well as
in the cultural modification and enhancement of them, my focus is broader than that of Huxley
and Spencer. My inquiry addresses the following points: moral enhancement as the main
motor of moral progress versus changes in the “circumstances of moral practices”; traditional
forms of moral enhancement versus biological moral enhancement; evolutionary limits to
moral progress versus evolutionary enabling conditions.
The first point concerns the question as to whether moral progress requires, in the first
instance, individual improvement in terms of improved capacities or cultivated virtues, or
rather changes in the circumstances of moral practices, such as increased factual knowledge,
experiences people make in their lives,2 technological developments,3 social exchange
(Kitcher, 196) and the emergence of an alternative to a given harmful institutionalised practice
(Pleasants 2011, 149). I shall provide reasons for thinking that moral enhancement and
changes in the circumstances of moral practices are mutually supportive, and that an account
of how moral progress can best be achieved should not focus on either of them exclusively.
With regard to the second point, the current debate about the possibility and desirability of
moral bioenhancement (the enhancement of moral capacities by biomedical and genetic
means; see Douglas 2008 and 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2008; Zarpentine 2013), I side
with those who defend the preferability of traditional forms of moral enhancement.
1 Philip Kitcher distinguishes “how possibly” explanations from “how actually” explanations. Evolutionary
explanations of the latter sort are available in the domain of morality, but there are not many of them (yet).
For the most part we lack the necessary evidence for providing explanations of how “the ethical project” actually
developed (Kitcher 2011, 11). A “how possibly” explanation aims to tell a story that is “consistent with the
evidence and with background constraints” (Kitcher, 12).
2 Experiences play a role in both individual development and the circumstances of morality. This shows that
ultimately the distinction cannot do justice to the phenomena. Nevertheless I take it to be useful for my purposes.
In this essay I focus on personal experiences understood as part of the circumstances of morality, thereby not
denying that experience also plays a crucial role in individual moral development.
3 There is, for instance, the interesting concept of “technomoral change”. See Boenink et al. 2010, Swierstra and
Keulartz 2011.
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Regarding the third point, I shall argue that evolutionary explanations can show us certain
limits to the possibility for humans of progressing morally as well as certain enabling
conditions, for example by telling us something about the capacities that it might be important
to strengthen or weaken in order to facilitate the achievement of moral progress, and
by teaching us something about ourselves that has the potential of altering our moral
beliefs for the better.
A discussion of two examples of areas in which moral progress seems possible serves to
illustrate the interplay between enhancement and changing circumstances as well as the role
that evolutionary considerations play in both. Here I shall not attempt to hide my normative
views concerning how we ought to go about in the attempt to make moral progress in
these two areas. While my account of moral progress is evolutionarily informed, I
shall stress that evolutionary considerations are only one factor among many others
that play a role in the explanation and achievement of moral progress, and pay attention also to
some of these other factors.
2 The Notion of Moral Progress
A few remarks about the notion of moral progress are in order. Moral progress has been
defined in many different ways. I shall understand it in the way expressed by Dale Jamieson’s
“Naïve conception”: “Moral progress occurs when a subsequent state of affairs is better than a
preceding one, or when right acts become increasingly prevalent” (Jamieson 2002b,
318). This conception is qualified by the important constraint that there have to be
“close causal, cultural and temporal connections” between the states of affairs that are
compared (Jamieson 2002b, 332).
The notion of moral progress that I use is “evolutionarily informed”. I do not take an
independent concept of moral progress and ask how it relates to evolution. Moral progress is
understood as something that human beings are capable of. The concept refers to an ideal, but
not to one that is in conflict with facts of our evolutionary history. Therefore, the term “better”
in the naïve conception should be understood as referring to standards that are not in conflict
with the evolutionary limitations of human morality.
I agree with Jamieson that an evolutionary account of morality should be understood as
“explaining why morality evolved and persists among creatures like us”, not as justifying
morality or as determining its content (Jamieson 2002b, 322). Understood in this way, it does
not exclude moral progress, but neither does it ensure it (Jamieson 2002b, 323). Morality is
autonomous. Its biological basis limits it, without thereby determining it: “[e]volution may
have brought morality into existence and established the parameters of what might constitute
possible moralities for creatures like us” (Jamieson, 323).4 Knowledge of those biological
limits should inform one’s notion of moral progress.
The kind of moral progress I am concerned with is local rather than global. Global moral
progress seems to me impossible to establish, given the complexity of the world and the fact
that moral progress in one area or practice is often accompanied by moral regress in another.
The most often cited example of moral progress is the abolition of slavery. Other examples that
are discussed in the philosophical literature include: the “softening in human cruelty”
(Jamieson 2002a, 21), the abolition of cruel punishment (Macklin 1977, 376), the animal
4 For biological constraints on the content of human morality see also van Schaik et al. 2013, 78.
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rights movement (Jamieson 2002a, 22), the emancipation of women in many parts of the world
(Kitcher 2011, 145–153) and the elimination of foot-binding (Appiah 2010, 53–100). The
abolition of slavery arguably depended on the toleration of the suffering of British workers (see
Pleasants, 155), and old forms of slavery have been replaced by new forms, which in some
respects are even crueller (see Bales 2012). While in many places there is a constant
development towards full gender equality, in parts of the Islamic world we see a reverse
development, culminating in the practices of IS whose members are currently enslaving
women. While the laws of Western democracies express, to a certain extent, the equal rights
of their citizens, the governments of these countries ignore or even violate the basic rights of
people living in poor and war-torn countries through their trade and environmental policies,
arms exports and so forth.
3 The “Locus” of Moral Progress
A question that arises when we think about moral progress is the following: What is the key to
its achievement, the capacities of individuals or the circumstances in which they act, think and
feel morally? Can an evolutionarily informed account of moral progress provide an answer to
this question?
In Peter Singer’s account, the human capacity to reason has a central place. Ethics has its
basis in our social nature and the requirements of group living, “but in the thought of reasoning
beings, it takes on a logic of its own which leads to its extension beyond the bounds of the
group” (Singer 1981, 114). Moral progress is taken to consist in the expansion of the circle of
moral concern, from our kin to non-kin that belongs to the in-group, to all human beings and
ultimately to all sentient beings (Singer, 120–124). It is the faculty of reason that makes this
expansion possible. Through reasoning, we are able to overcome those evolved tendencies that
hinder the expansion of the circle, such as the tendency to feel obliged to help those who are
close to us, but not far away strangers, or the tendency, ubiquitous in human history, to
condemn certain ways of treating members of the in-group while permitting treating out-group
members that way. This view implies that the key to making progress in morality is to get
people to use their reasoning capacities more. If we only were more rational, the world would
be a better place. However, Singer acknowledges that, given the way human beings are, the
actual achievement of moral progress requires certain social institutions (1981, 170–173).
An alternative to Singer’s view is one that places the emphasis on emotional capacities. On
such a view, the key to progressing morally is to enhance those capacities, either by traditional
means such as moral education and cognitive strategies, for instance strategies for enhancing
self-control (see Zarpentine 2013, 142), or through biomedical or genetic means (Douglas
2008; Persson and Savulescu 2008). A related approach is the virtue-ethical account of moral
progress, according to which the key for moral progress lies in cultivating certain virtues (see
e.g. Williston 2011). In the case of ethical progress in the area of climate change, for instance,
candidates for virtues that need to be cultivated include justice, sympathy, respect and modesty.
The hope is that by cultivating such “green” virtues, people will come to see that the members
of future generations belong to our moral community, just as every human being living on this
earth here and now does (Williston, 157 f.).
But perhaps the capacities or virtues of individuals should not be the focus of accounts of
moral progress and we should draw our attention to the circumstances of moral practices
instead? An example of an account of moral progress that focuses on the circumstances of
42 J. Hermann
morality is that of Philip Kitcher. Kitcher conceives of ethics as a “social technology” and of
moral progress in terms of “functional refinement” (Kitcher, 231 and 221). This view of moral
progress is opposed to one that takes it to consist in the “substitution of ethical truth for ethical
falsehood” (Kitcher, 187). Unlike the latter view, the former fits well with the evolution of the
ethical project as Kitcher conceives of it (Kitcher, 187).5 He identifies “remedying altruism
failures” as the original function of ethics (Kitcher, 222). Human beings evolved limited
capacities for psychological altruism that can be exercised under certain circumstances
(Kitcher, 226).6 Altruism failures occur and need to be remedied. This is where morality or
ethics comes in. Our ancestors faced this problem of altruism failures and addressed it by
starting the ethical project. The way in which they first tried to remedy these failures created
new problems, which then generated new functions for ethics (Kitcher, 226). The original
function of ethics can be refined through i) “advances in techniques of socialization”, ii)
“integrating the [ethical] code with the system of punishment”, or iii) expanding the circle
(Kitcher, 230 ff.). This refinement is mainly a matter of cultural evolution. According to
Kitcher, Singer’s account of moral progress captures only one mode of moral progress.
3.1 Moral Enhancement, Traditional or Biological
I shall now turn to the debate between advocates of traditional moral enhancement and
advocates of moral bioenhancement in order to elaborate on the idea that attempts to achieve
moral progress should focus on individual capacities. This debate also illustrates how refer-
ences to Darwinian evolution can be used for yielding opposing results.7
Defenders of biological moral enhancement argue that it is the best response to the threats
posed by the advancements of science, in particular by technological developments (Persson
and Savulescu 2011, 2013). They take enhancement to be urgently needed in order to avoid
that “morally defective” individuals use the available knowledge and technology to cause
extensive harm, a risk that is intensified by the available means for cognitive enhancement
(Zarpentine, 142). Advocates of bioenhancement claim that traditional forms of enhancement
take too much time and are unlikely to work because they depend on prior moral motivation
(Zarpentine, 143).
Moral bioenhancement includes “direct pharmacological or surgical manipulation of the
brain or selection of genetic material conducive to the aims of moral enhancement”
(Zarpentine, 143). Its advocates propose, for instance, the suppression of “counter-moral
emotions” such as “strong aversion to certain racial groups” and “the impulse towards violent
aggression” (Douglas 2008, 231). They believe that evolutionary theory and primatology can
show us those moral capacities that have a biological basis and should therefore in principle be
within the reach of biomedical and genetic treatment. According to Persson and Savulescu
(2008), the core moral dispositions of altruism and a sense of fairness are of this kind. While in
her article about moral progress, Ruth Macklin emphasises that moral progress expresses
changes in moral beliefs, not in human nature (1977, 377), advocates of moral
bioenhancement envisage exactly the opposite. The need for bioenhancement is justified,
5 Kitcher’s genealogical story combines elements of biological and cultural evolution.
6 Psychological altruism has to be distinguished from biological altruism. While biological altruism requires
merely that behaviour advances the biological fitness of another at the cost of the being whose behaviour it is,
psychological altruism requires that one acts with the intention, or out of the motivation, to further someone else’s
interests, without this being to one’s own advantage (see e.g. Sober and Wilson 1998).
7 Due to limited space, I shall not consider enhancement in connection with debates about transhumanism.
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among others, by reference to the claim that our evolved moral capacities are not apt for many
of the problems we are facing today, because the circumstances in which they evolved were so
different from ours (see Persson and Savulescu 2011).
In addition to their ethical dubiousness, proposals for moral bioenhancement stand on
shaky ground, as Chris Zarpentine shows.8 The envisaged interventions face serious problems
raised by the complexity in moral psychological development (“ontogenetic complexity”), in
particular the complex interactions between genes and environment, and the “neuropsycho-
logical complexity” of moral psychology (Zarpentine, 145). Zarpentine objects to the claim
that the sense of justice is primarily determined by our genes, pointing to the complex
interactions between genes and environment and to empirical research that suggests that
people’s judgements about questions of fairness are more strongly influenced by societal
factors than by their genes (Zarpentine, 147).
Zarpentine criticises defenders of bioenhancement for having “misrepresented the facts of
human psychology” (2013, 141). He argues that humans “are not adapted to any particular past
environment”, but have evolved a “capacity for phenotypic plasticity” (Zarpentine, 148), i.e.
the capacity “to develop different psychological and behavioural phenotypes in different
environments” (Zarpentine, 144). This enables them to adjust to changed circumstances.
Humans are “designed to respond adaptively to [their] environment” (Zarpentine, 148).
Zarpentine uses this insight for an argument in favour of traditional forms of moral enhance-
ment, which make use of the human capacity for phenotypic plasticity. According to him, we
can exploit that capacity by educational means and through strategies that allow us to shape
our affective responses, for example “‘reframing strategies’ that direct attention away from
tempting stimuli” and “mental contrasting”, which is the strategy of imagining the goal that
one wants to achieve and contrasting this with the present situation and the obstacles that stand
in the way of achieving the goal (Zarpentine, 149). According to this view, evolutionary theory
tells us that we should in principle be capable of solving complex problems that result from
increased global interdependence and advanced technology.
While starting out from individual capacities, Zarpentine ends up arguing that the most
promising enhancement strategy is the modification of the social or institutional context (2013,
150). He calls this strategy “ecological engineering” (Zarpentine, 149). We should use “our
species’ talent for modifying our environment to promote moral progress” (Zarpentine, 150).
This bears similarities with Kitcher’s account of how human have refined the social technology
that is ethics and contrasts with the view of Zarpentine’s opponents, who think that we have the
talent to modify our environment in a way that we cannot adapt to. Zarpentine’s position is an
example of an approach that focuses on individual capacities while at the same time highlight-
ing the role of institutions.
The debate about the right form of moral enhancement shows that different understandings
of the evolution of certain capacities lead to different views as to how we should go about
enhancing them.What both views have in common is the focus on the capacities of individuals
and the assumption that evolution can, to a certain extent, show us the way in which moral
enhancement should proceed. Traditional moral enhancement has the advantage of relying on
means and strategies that have already proven to be effective (see Zarpentine, 148), and it gains
8 Moral bioenhancement is ethically problematic, because in order to be effective, it would have to be
compulsory (see Persson and Savulescu 2008), which implies that some authority would have to decide for
everyone what the desired degree of altruism is etc., we do not know what side-effects it might have, and so forth.
For ethical objections and how it might be possible to meet them see Douglas 2008, 235 ff.
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further plausibility through its acknowledgement of the role of institutions. It moreover avoids
serious ethical worries (see note 8).9
3.2 Changes in the Circumstances of Moral Practices
Let me say a bit more about the idea that changes in the circumstances of our moral practices
can bring about moral progress, by introducing the idea that these practices are in part
constituted by their “surroundings”. This notion is narrower than that of the circumstances
of morality. Not everything that is part of the circumstances of morality is constitutive of our
shared moral practices. Any particular experience of any particular individual, or any
particular instance of social exchange, for example, does not belong to the constitu-
ents of moral practices.
On the Wittgensteinian account of moral practices that I developed elsewhere, these
practices are constituted not merely by certain rules, but also by their aims, their point, and
their “surroundings” (or environment).10 The term “surroundings” refers to certain facts such
as the fact that human beings are vulnerable and that there is scarcity of goods, and to facts of
our evolutionary history. These facts limit the possible differences between moralities. Recall
Jamieson’s insight that evolution “may have […] established the parameters of what might
constitute possible moralities for creatures like us” (Jamieson 2002b, 323). In the light of these
facts about our evolved nature and the world we live in, it makes sense that moral rules that can
be found across all cultures include prohibitions on lying and murder, restrictions on
the use of violence, the rule that infants must be protected, and the incest taboo, and
not for example their opposites. While those facts do not justify these moral norms, the norms
nevertheless depend on them. The facts make these norms useful for human beings and not
others (see Hermann 2015, chapter 7).
“Surroundings” also refers to the existence of certain knowledge such as knowledge about
the causes and effects of climate change. That knowledge, which we were lacking a few
decades ago, is constitutive of our current moral practices. Flying was not morally relevant
60 years ago, but it is now. The fact that we now have knowledge about the long-
term effects of pollution has changed our moral practices. The environment of moral practices
moreover includes technological developments and the emergence of alternatives to actual
practices (see Pleasants, 149).
Whether our attempts to achieve moral progress should focus on enhancement or on the
circumstances of morality partly depends on empirical questions such as whether, for instance,
people are likely to have experiences that can counter their “strong aversion to certain racial
groups” (Douglas, 231) or whether they are likely to gain the kind of knowledge that can
counter-act such an aversion. Which view is more realistic: the view that such “counter-moral
emotions” can be suppressed by biological means or traditional forms of enhancement, or the
position that people will lose them as a result of having made certain experiences and having
gained certain knowledge? How effective are experiences and knowledge in this respect?
These questions are difficult to answer. Zarpentine’s account of traditional forms of enhance-
ment shows that enhancement and modifications of the circumstances are interrelated.
9 A further problem for proposals of moral bioenhancement is that after the respective biological interventions,
we might not be able to speak of people acting as moral agents anymore, and consequently not of moral progress.
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this worry.
10 For a more detailed exposition of these ideas see Hermann 2015 chapter 2.
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However, he conceives of such modifications in terms of an enhancement strategy, thus
subordinating changes in the circumstances of moral practices to individual enhancement,
which he seems to identify with moral progress. I want to go in a slightly different direction,
suggesting conceiving of enhancement and changed circumstances as two equally important,
mutually supportive factors that facilitate moral progress, understood as the transition towards
a state of affairs that is better than the previous one according to standards that are internal to
our moral practices.
4 Distant Needy and Non-Human Animals
Let me illustrate the interplay between enhancement and changed circumstances, and the
powers of cultural forces, by way of looking at two areas in which further moral progress is
possible: our relationship towards the distant needy and our relation towards non-human
animals. In each of these areas, both the education of capacities and virtues and changes in
the circumstances of morality can contribute to the achievement of moral progress. Since
evolutionary considerations, which I shall situate within the factors that can bring about moral
progress, are only one factor among many, parts of my discussion of the examples are
not related to evolution. That I chose examples that fit the metaphor of the expanding
circle particularly well does not mean that I conceive of moral progress exclusively in terms of
this metaphor.
4.1 Moral Obligations towards the Distant Needy
According to Singer, acknowledging that we have moral obligations towards people who are
far away from us amounts to an expansion of the circle of moral concern. Has humanity
achieved this expansion? It seems that some progress has indeed been made. Today, a
considerable number of individuals living in affluent countries tries to help people who are
suffering in the world’s poorest countries by donating money or doing paid or unpaid work for
governmental and nongovernmental organisations. I assume that in most cases, these dona-
tions and practical engagement express the recognition of certain obligations towards those
who are being helped. These obligations can be conceived of as positive duties to help (see
Singer 1972), or as negative duties to stop harming (see Pogge 2004).11 The circle of moral
concern thus seems to have expanded to include the distant needy. However, we can also
observe behaviour that casts doubt on this claimed expansion. Most people do not feel obliged
to refrain from buying their children luxury goods instead of using that money to provide basic
goods for African children, for example.12 Also, the donations people make are often very
small and almost not felt by the donors. Moreover, the majority of citizens of rich countries
support the exploitation of workers in countries such as Bangladesh, including the practice of
child labour, with the choices they make as consumers. Such behaviour and attitude shows that
the moral progress that has been made in this area is very limited. How might further progress
be achieved?
11 According to Pogge, the duties of governments and citizens of affluent countries towards the global poor stem
from their involvement in the causation of their misery. Extreme poverty is partly due to colonisation and to the
rules of the global economic order, i.e. to a specific power regime.
12 For the view that above a certain threshold, justice requires parents to support other people’s children instead
of buying their own children unnecessary goods see Rachels 1997.
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4.1.1 Changes in the Circumstances of Moral Practices
Let us consider the circumstances of moral practices first. Here relevant factors include
increased knowledge about the causes of poverty, an increase in possibilities for helping the
poor, including better knowledge of these possibilities and assistance in making use of them, as
well as personal experiences, for example during a trip through a poor country.13 For instance,
knowledge about international trade can lead people to the conclusion that the current system
puts poor countries at a disadvantage and that the majority of the population of those countries
is indirectly harmed by everyone who supports a government that in turn supports the current
global order (Pogge 2004). Such a view can motivate people to put pressure on governments
and non-state actors to change that system, which manifests specific power relations.
Furthermore, new technological possibilities enable new ways of organising help, for example
via online platforms.
Asked how he came to be so concerned with the issue of global justice, Thomas Pogge
answered that it was a trip through Asia that made him aware of how immensely people were
suffering in some parts of the world (conversation with Pogge at the Carnegie Council on
January 19th 2012).14 Such experiences have the potential to affect people in a way that
changes their moral beliefs.15 Having seen the immense suffering with one’s own eyes, one
might think differently about issues such as global justice or duties towards the poor.
What is the role of evolutionary explanations? Such explanations provide a reason for
questioning intuitions such as the one, which is widespread, that we have greater duties towards
our family and friends than towards strangers (see Greene 2007, 47). Once we learn that having
such an intuition was adaptive for our ancestors, we should think about whether there are good
reasons for this priority of duties, and whether our duties towards strangers are not stronger than
is usually assumed. As Singer puts it: “What we take as an untouchable moral intuition may be
nomore than a relic of our evolutionary history” (1981: 70). “Biological explanations of ethics”
can make us “think again about moral intuitions which we take to be self-evident moral truths
but can be explained in evolutionary terms” (Singer, 84). I think that there are reasons for
prioritising our duties in the way most people do, for instance the fact that usually we are more
capable of helping those who are close to us, and the fact that we cannot give the children of
others the same love that we can give to our own children. However, due to the internet, the
existence of international organisations and the possibility to set up projects on a small scale
there is a lot that we can do for people in other parts of the world, and this provides us with
reasons for accepting relatively strong obligations towards them as well.
4.1.2 Moral Enhancement
I just identified parts of the circumstances of morality that can be the motor of moral progress.
Now I shall consider ways in which moral enhancement, in its traditional form, is able to
advance progress in this area. The focus will be on moral education, but other traditional forms
of enhancement will be touched upon in passing. It seems to me that an important task of
moral education in this regard is to encourage children and adolescents to imagine the suffering
13 Education is of course relevant here, but not the kind of education that I shall focus on in the next section, i.e.
moral education.
14 The conversation can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GP7wHi3nOEg&feature=relmfu.
15 Of course personal experiences can also change one’s moral beliefs for worse.
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of people in extremely poor countries such as Niger or Sierra Leone. This is a use of
“induction”, the educational method that consists in attempting to make someone imagine
what it feels like for another person to be in distress. Training the imagination in this way
seems to be crucial for getting people to care about a group they did not care about (much)
previously. Humans can thereby transcend their evolutionarily based bias towards their own
group and come to react with strong emotions to the fact that people whom they do not know
and who live far away from them are suffering. As we know from recent empirical studies,
emotions play a crucial role in making moral judgements (see e.g. Greene et al. 2001; Greene
and Haidt 2002; Greene 2005; Prinz 2006; Young et al. 2010). The training of emotions, which
is a crucial component of moral education, and the training of the imagination should not be
conflated, but they are closely related.16 Induction is used to further the “development of guilt
and moral internalization in children” (Hoffman 2000, 10). Training of the imagination can
moreover expand the scope of emotional reactions. If we can bring it about that children
become adults whose “emotional buttons” (Greene 2007, 47) are pushed by the suffering of
distant strangers, the expansion of the circle will likely be more substantive than the one we
have achieved so far. My suggestion is that a sentimentalist way of expanding the circle has to
accompany the rationalist way described by Singer. But of course it is highly unlikely, and
perhaps also not desirable, that the bias will ever be overcome entirely. There are evolutionary
limits to the capacity of caring for others.
The possibility of training our imagination in the way described supports the claim that we
have a capacity for phenotypic plasticity. Humans are in principle able to adapt to the highly
globalised world they have created, for instance by strengthening their ability to imagine what
it feels like to suffer from extreme hunger and thirst, thereby broadening the scope of their
emotional dispositions. This kind of training of the imagination has not only a place in moral
education, but also in the moral enhancement of adults.
On a virtue ethical account, moral progress requires the cultivation and broadening of
virtues such as benevolence, generosity, justice, sympathy and respect. As Williston argues in
connection with climate change ethics, becoming more virtuous requires not to restrict the
moral community in ways that are unjustified, for example by failing to recognise members of
future generations as members of that community (2011, 158). In the case of the distant needy,
who, unlike the members of future generations, exist, it is uncontroversial that they ought to be
seen as members of the moral community.
Of course moral education has to be complemented by the development of complex
reasoning capacities, since agents who lack such capacities cannot address complex moral
problems. Regarding our duties towards the global poor, we need these capacities for
deliberating about how to weigh those and the duties we have towards members of our family,
friends, and fellow citizens, for deciding which organisation to support or work for, what kind
of changes in the international trade system to push for and so forth. While emotions can make
us aware of our duties towards the poor and motivate us to help them, reason is needed for
making the right decisions regarding what actions to take.
4.1.3 The Interaction of Enhancement and Changes in the Circumstances
I have suggested that both changes within the circumstances in which we think, feel and act
morally and ways of educating moral capacities and virtues can contribute to moral progress in
16 I thank an anonymous reviewer for asking me to clarify this.
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the area of our relation to distant strangers. How are the two related and which is more
important?
The availability of knowledge about the causes of poverty, for instance, depends on the
existence of people who do research on this topic and on people who make the effort of
making the results of that research publicly available. It is desirable that those people do these
things in a morally responsible way, and moral education, if successful, results in agents who
take moral concerns seriously. Also the motivation to carry out this kind of research and make
it publicly available can be the result of moral education, but such research might also be
motivated exclusively by non-moral interests such as an interest in economic processes, or
even by immoral interests such as an interest in how the poor could be exploited even more
effectively. The availability of possibilities to help depends on people who create these
possibilities, for example by setting up charities or development projects to which people
can contribute. Again, by investing in moral education we make it more likely that there will in
the future be sufficient people who do these things.
At the same time, moral education depends, for instance, on knowledge about people’s
suffering and its causes. In the course of moral training, children and adolescents are confronted
with paradigmatic cases of immense suffering, become aware of possible ways to relieve that
suffering, get an insight into how their own life is related to the lives of those who are suffering,
acquire tools for deliberating about how to counteract extreme poverty and so forth. In addition,
existing power regimes limit the chance to recognise strong duties towards the distant poor.
It is, therefore, very likely that moral progress in this area is brought about by the interplay
of features of the circumstances and moral education or enhancement. This insight counts
against views that focus one-sidedly on either the circumstances or enhancement.
Modifications that lead to a moral improvement of the motives of agents, which is how
Thomas Douglas understands moral enhancement (2008, 229), cannot bring about moral
progress on their own. The view that urgent problems such as climate change can be attributed
exclusively to the motivational deficits of people (Douglas 2008, 230) is overly simplistic.
4.2 Moral Obligations towards Animals
Jamieson mentions the animal rights movement as an example of local moral progress
(Jamieson 2002a, 22). For Singer, once the circle of moral concern encompasses also most
non-human animals, its expansion is complete and human reason has reached a triumphalist
victory over evolutionary biases.17 According to Singer, “[t]he only justifiable stopping place
for the expansion of altruism is the point at which all whose welfare can be affected by our
actions are included within the circle of altruism” (1981: 120; see also 1995). Unfortunately
the conditions in which most of the animals that are used for food are kept have not improved
much since Jonathan Safran Foer described them in his bestseller Eating Animals in Safran-
Foer 2009. As Nigel Pleasants writes in his article about the abolition of slavery, the
exploitation of animals for food is an example of an immoral practice that is generally
accepted, despite the knowledge about the enormous suffering it causes (2011, 147). If we
look at it from this perspective, our relationship with animals seems like an area in which
moral progress is urgently needed, rather than one in which substantial progress has already
been achieved. Let us again consider separately some features of the circumstances that are
17 The reason why Singer excludes some animals is that in some cases it is doubtful that the animal is able to feel
anything. He mentions oysters and “even more rudimentary organisms” (Singer 1981: 120).
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relevant for making moral progress in this area and the progressive potential of moral
education. What Singer wrote in 1981 still holds: “The expansion of the moral circle to
non-human animals is only just getting under way” (Singer, 121).
4.2.1 Changes in the Circumstances of Moral Practices
Factors that can effect people’s beliefs about the moral acceptability of practices such as
factory farming, testing medicines and cosmetics on animals, keeping animals in zoos or
breeding fish in aquacultures, include, but are of course not limited to, increased (or better
available) knowledge about the conditions in those farms, laboratories, zoos and aquacultures,
knowledge about animals’ capacities for suffering and knowledge about how much we share
with other animals.18 It is with regard to the last kind of knowledge that evolutionary theory
comes in. It provides us with reasons for accepting our animal nature and rejecting the view
that there is a radical discontinuity between Homo sapiens and other primates. Primatologists
such as Frans de Waal have spent countless hours observing our closest evolutionary cousins,
chimpanzees and bonobos, and suggest interpreting their behaviour as exhibiting retributive
emotions, empathy and an impulse to help (de Waal 2006, 18 ff.). No matter if the social
behaviour of non-human primates is regarded as different from human morality only in degree
or in kind,19 the observations of primatologists make us aware of the continuities between
other primates and us. This awareness can change our attitude towards them. Perhaps the Great
Ape Project will gain more adherents in the future (http://www.greatapeproject.org).
Relevant experiences include seeing a factory farm, slaughterhouse or animal lab from the
inside, and observing animals, seeing how their behaviour reveals sensitivity and intelligence.
Examples of relevant social exchanges are conversations with animal activists or people
working in for example a factory farm, and debates among friends about topics such as
vegetarianism or veganism. Such experiences, conversations and debates can change our
moral beliefs and thereby the way we act. We might become vegetarians, found or join a
vegan society, organise a campaign against zoos, or stop buying cosmetics that were tested on
animals. The possibility to produce meat in the lab is an example of a new technological
possibility that changes moral practices and can contribute to moral progress.
As mentioned above, Pleasants has pointed out another way in which the circumstances of
morality matter. As he argues convincingly in his article about the abolition of slavery, the
abolition of a harmful institutionalised practice requires the existence of a plausible alternative,
which in the case of slavery was wage labour. The ability to point to an alternative that is
available and superior lifts objections to a harmful institutionalised practice “out of the realm
of merely moralistic expression and into that of efficacious radical social criticism” (2011,
156). Although the abolition of for instance factory farming still seems to be a long way off, it
is at least possible that an alternative to this practice will continue to take shape, gradually
gaining widespread recognition as plausible and superior. Once more and more people come to
see that factory farming is by no means necessary in order to feed the world’s population,
criticism of this practice may become more widely respected and effective.20
18 Safran Foer made an important contribution to the wider dissemination of information about factory farms.
19 For this controversy see for instance Macedo and Ober 2006.
20 An example of alternative farming is Joel Salatin’s Polyface farm, which is presented on the farm’s website as
a “family owned, multi-generational, pasture-based, beyond organic, local-market farm and informational
outreach in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley” (http://www.polyfacefarms.com/, accessed on 12 April 2016). I
thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing me to this.
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4.2.2 Moral Enhancement
How can moral education contribute to moral progress with regard to our relationship with
animals? One example is the use of “induction” in relation to animals. This involves for
instance the attempt to make a child who has hurt an animal to make her imagine what it would
feel like to experience similar harm. Induction highlights the distress of the victim as well as
the action that caused it (see e.g. Hoffman 2000, 10).
Like in the case of our responsibilities towards the distant needy, training the imagination in
this way is crucial. Within the course of moral education, children should be encouraged to
imagine how it must feel for an animal to live in a small cage, to stand the whole day in their
own faeces, to be separated from their offspring, to be experimented upon and so forth. We can
conceive of this also in terms of cultivating certain virtues. By strengthening our imagination
and our capacity for empathy, we can extend our altruistic tendencies beyond the limits that
can be explained by evolutionary forces.
Currently animals are sometimes used in the classroom with the purpose of advancing
children’s moral development, in particular the development of empathy (see Daly and Suggs
2010). On the condition that the well being of those animals is guaranteed, making children
sensitive to the needs and interests of animals could extend this practice. In this extended
version of the practice, there would be animals in classrooms not only for the development of
empathy in general, but also for the development of empathy in relation to non-human animals
in particular. This requires that teachers have the appropriate attitude and regard the animals
not merely as instruments for developing empathy in humans, but also as creatures that ought
to be the object of moral concern.
Drawing once again on Pleasants’ article about slavery, it would make a big difference if
children learned about practices such as using animals for food, research etc. in a manner that
was not value-neutral. While our children learn at the same time what sort of practice slavery is
and that it is morally wrong, they usually learn that animal products serve nutritional and other
functions, and it is only later that they might begin to question such use of animals (Pleasants,
152). Those vegetarians and vegans whose children learn simultaneously what animals are
used for and that this use is morally problematic, or wrong, are a small minority. Following that
minority in making children aware of the ethical questions related to the use of animals from
early childhood onwards would be a big step towards moral progress in this area.
4.2.3 The Interaction of Enhancement and Changes in the Circumstances
Since the general point about the interaction between capacities and circumstances should be
relatively clear by now, I shall set out only briefly how the educational means just described
interact with features of the circumstances. People who have been trained to care about the
well being of animals are more likely to make the effort to inform the public about cruel
practices, to popularise the results of scientific research on the capacities of animals and to look
for alternatives to current practices. Information about such alternatives, about animals’
capacities and about the ways in which many animals are currently being treated can be used
in moral education. The use of the method of induction as applied to animals requires adults
who are capable of empathising with animals and for whom animals are objects of moral
concern. The different kinds of knowledge listed above can contribute to such an ability and
attitude in adults who did not require them during childhood. Like in the case previously
discussed, moral enhancement and changes in the circumstances are mutually supportive.
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5 Conclusion
I hope to have provided some insight into the complexity of the relationship between
evolutionary explanations of morality and moral progress. As we have seen, different views
of the evolution of certain capacities lead to different views as to how we should go about
enhancing these capacities, and can moreover result in different estimations of the prospects
for moral progress. It was argued that moral enhancement and changes in the circumstances of
morality are mutually reinforcing, and that accounts which focus one-sidedly on either of them
are inadequate.
As illustrated by means of two examples, evolutionary considerations are relevant for the
assessment of possibilities for moral enhancement, and increased evolutionary knowledge
figures among the relevant changes in the circumstances of moral practices. Two general
points can be made here: First, evolutionary theory gives us hints as to what the natural
limitations of for example altruistic tendencies are, and how they could be overcome. As
Zarpentine’s proposals for traditional moral enhancement demonstrate, a view of the human
being as having evolved a capacity for phenotypic plasticity can, in combination with
knowledge about human moral psychology, serve as the basis for claims about possible ways
of achieving moral progress via moral enhancement. I suggested that strengthening certain
imaginative capacities is one way of adjusting our emotional responses to new moral prob-
lems. As I argued with reference to recent empirical research, a sentimentalist way of
expanding the circle of moral concern should complement the rationalist way described by
Singer. Secondly, knowledge about the possible evolutionary origin of certain widespread
moral intuitions give us a reason to subject these intuitions to critical scrutiny, since circum-
stances might have changed thus that the intuitions have become inadequate. However, it has
to be stressed that evolutionary considerations are only one factor among many others that play
a role in the explanation and achievement of moral progress, and I have addressed some of
these other factors.
Given the speculative character of many evolutionary explanations and the variety of
hypotheses that are around, references to evolution can be used to support pessimistic as
well as optimistic moral outlooks. According to the most pessimistic evolutionarily in-
formed outlook, given the inaptness of our evolved emotional responses and the dim
prospects of both traditional and biological moral enhancement, moral progress is highly
unlikely to occur. According to the most optimistic outlook, given our capacity for
phenotypic plasticity, increasing knowledge of moral psychology and a better understanding
of the evolution of the ethical project, the chances are good that there will be (further)
moral progress. As my discussion of the two examples has shown, I see real possibilities
for making moral progress, but whether they will become actual is an open question.21
With Kitcher and John Dewey, I share the hope that “a properly informed understanding of
the ethical project and its evolution might lead our successors to pursue it more sure-
footedly” (Kitcher, 207).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
21 I am indepted to Jeroen Hopster and Wouter Kalf for their useful feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. I
would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for a number of helpful comments.
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